Electoral Incentives, Informational Asymmetries, and the Policy Bias Toward Special Interests by Lohmann, Susanne
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
ELECTORAL INCENTIVES, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, 
AND THE POLICY BIAS TOWARD SPECIAL INTERESTS 
Susanne Lohmann 
� 
< 
er:: 
0 1891 
U-
') /... 
0 
,... 
0 
0 
r 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 995 
March 1994 
Revised July 1996 
Electoral Incentives, Informational 
· Asymmetries, and the Policy Bias 
Toward Special Interests 
Susanne Lohmann 
Abstract 
Political decisions are often biased in favor of special interests at the expense of the 
general public, and they are frequently inefficient in the sense that the losses incurred by the 
majority exceed the gains enjoyed by the minority. This paper provides an explanation 
based on informational asymmetries and the free rider problem: (i) incumbents increase 
their chances of re-election by biasing policy toward groups that are better able to monitor 
their activities; and (ii) smaller groups are better able to overcome the free rider problem of 
costly monitoring so that policy will be biased in their favor. A welfare analysis examines 
the effect of asymmetric monitoring on voter welfare. Tbe inefficiencies created by the 
policy bias are offset by a positively-valued selection bias: incumbents of above-average 
quality. are more likely to survive voter scrutiny than are low-quality types. Journal of 
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1 Introduction 
An intriguing empirical regularity holds across democracies characterized by different 
political and economic institutions and across diverse applications such as agricultural and 
trade protection, economic regulation, and income transfers. Special interests enjoy political 
hand-outs at the expense of the general public, and this distributional bias is associated with 
a social deadweight loss. 
An example serves to illustrate this empirical regularity. In industrialized 
democracies, agricultural production is supported at the expense of taxpayers and 
consumers, by virtue of direct transfers and subsidies as well as market interventions that 
indirectly improve farm income by increasing the relative price of agricultural products. In 
the United States, one third of the earnings from farming are due to protective agricultural 
policies; the corresponding numbers are one half and two thirds for the European 
Community and Japan, respectively. _The implied levels of taxation are quite extraordinary. 
In 1990, the average cost of f arm protection amounted to $1,400 a year for each non-farm 
household in industrialized societies, and this number is expected to increase to $1,800 (in 
1990 prices) by the year 2000. By some estimates, a phased 50% reduction in agricultural 
protection would increase economic welfare in the United States, the European 
Community, and Japan by $32 bn (in 1985 prices); this number captures the increase in 
consumer surplus net of the loss in producer surplus. Agricultural protection persists in 
industrialized economies even though farm output contributes only 2-3% to gross domestic 
product and the percentage of voters who are members of farm-households has dwindled to 
the low single digits (Kym Anderson and Rod Tyers, 1992; The Economist, 1992). 
The persistence of inefficient and biased policies is puzzling, both from an economic 
and a political point of view. Economic theory predicts (absent transaction costs and other 
compli�ations) that inefficiencies will not persist. After all, each member of society would 
be made better off if such policies were eliminated and the individuals who gained from this 
move paid a side-payment to the losers (Ronald H. Coase, 1960). From the perspective of 
political science, we expect to observe the "tyranny of the majority·" in a democracy, that is, 
a political majority acquiring benefits at the expense of a political minority (Gordon 
Tullock, 1959). These predictions of economic and political theory are not fulfiHed 
empirically. 
2 Informational Asymmetries and the Logic of Collective 
Action 
Mancur Olson (1965) identifies the free rider problem of collective action as the 
source of the policy bias toward special interests: 
Since relatively small groups will frequently be able voluntarily to organize and 
act in support of their common interests, and since large groups normally will 
not be able to do so, the outcome of the political struggle among the various 
groups in society will not be symmetrical . . .. The small oligopolistic industry 
seeking a tariff or a tax loophole will sometimes attain its objective even if the 
vast majority of the population loses as a result. The smaller groups -- the 
privileged and intermediate groups -- can often defeat the large groups -- the 
latent groups -- which are normally supposed to prevail in a democracy. The 
privileged and intermediate groups often triumph over the numerically superior 
forces in the latent or large groups because the former are generally organized 
and active while the latter are normally unorganized and inactive (pp. 127-128). 
However, in a democracy characterized by regular free elections, the free rider 
problem of collective action is not sufficient to explain why political decision-makers cater 
to special interests. Arguably, rational voters would see through political attempts to favor 
special interests at their expense. A disaffected majority that is aware of the policy bias 
could then punish its political representatives by voting them out of office. 
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Thus, some voter ignorance assumption appears to be a necessary component of 
theories explaining the policy bias toward special interests. The standard story relies 
implicitly on voter illusion: it assumes that political incumbents can and do systematically 
fool a majority of voters by favoring special interests while keeping the costs imposed on 
the general public below some awareness threshold. 
Maintaining the assumption of voter rationality, voters can be thought of as rationally 
ill-informed (Anthony Downs, 1960). If information gathering is costly, then a large 
electorate faces a severe free rider problem of becoming informed about political 
alternatives that have the characteristic of being a (possibly differentiated-benefits) 
collective good. This problem is further exacerbated because the probability that any one 
vote -- whether informed or not -- makes a difference for the election outcome is usually 
very small. 
The notion that the policy bias derives from rational voter ignorance of this kind has 
some surface plausibility but becomes unsustainable under further scrutiny. As a by­
product of their daily lives, voters accumulate a considerable amount of information about 
their personal wealth and well-being. Even if they are ill-informed about policy details, they 
nonetheless know how well off they are, and they can base their vote on this knowledge. 
Indeed, one robust empirical regularity that holds across industrialized democracies is 
retrospective voting: incumbents who preside over good economic performance tend to be 
re-elected (Morris P. Fiorina, 1981 ). The literature on rational retrospective voting 
interprets such voting behaviqr as resulting from voters' rational inferences about some 
. ' 
positive-valued attribute of their representatives, formed on the basis of observed economic 
performance (Kenneth Rogoff and Anne Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990; see also Banks and 
Sundaram, 1993). 
In the face of retrospective voting, an office-motivated incumbent must trade off 
gains and losses in political support that follow from favoring one group of voters rather 
than another. It is simply not obvious that a policymaker can generate a net gain in political 
support by catering to a well-informed minority at the expense of an ill-informed majority, 
especially if the total losses incurred by the general public exceed the total gains enjoyed by 
special interests. Such a policy bias reduces the welfare of a majority of voters and 
decreases the likelihood that they will vote for the incumbent. If economists are correct in 
identifying the huge deadweight losses associated with political hand-outs to special 
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interests, then an incumbent who eradicated such inefficiencies would preside over an 
increase in standards of living that would sweep him to re-election. On theoretical grounds, 
there is reason to believe that a policymaker who is incompletely informed about voter 
preferences would have incentives to set policy in an unbiased and efficient way in order to 
maximize the welfare of his constituents and thereby maximize his re-election chances 
(Donald Wittman, 1989). 
This line of argument undermines the validity of standard models of interest group 
competition -- models of rent-seeking, political influence, directly unproductive activities, 
lobbying, and the like -- according to which political decisions are biased towards 
politically active special interests (Tullock, 1980; Sam Peltzman, 1976; Gary S. Becker, 
1983; Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982; Ronald J. Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982; 
Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie Young, 1989). The "reduced-form" 
approach that is standard in the literature black boxes the individual incentives to become 
informed and exert political pressures, as well as the incentives of political representatives 
to respond to such political pressures (Susanne Lohmann, 1995). For example, Becker's 
(1976) theory of interest group competition consists of a political pressure production 
function and a political influence function. The pressures generated by an interest group are 
assumed to be a function of the size of the group and the resources spent per group 
member. The likelihood that the group is successful in influencing a policy decision to its 
advantage is assumed to be a function of the political pressures it generates relative to 
competing interest groups. 
The reduced-form assumptions underlying such models are justified informally with 
reference to the free rider problem of participating in costly collective action and of costly 
information gathering (Peltzman, 1976). Because these models are lacking a formal 
microfoundation, their comparative statics are vulnerable to the Lucas-critique. The 
decision rules of private agents and their political representatives, which are buried in the 
reduced-form assumptions, may not be invariant to changes in exogenous parameters 
(Robert E.  Lucas, 1976). 
Two other sources of the policy bias toward special interests have been identified by 
economists and political scientists. One explanation asserts that policymakers favor 
organized interests in exchange for campaign contributions (Magee, Brock, and Young, 
1989; David P. Baron, 1994 ) . Another explanation invokes "legislative failure," that is,. 
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legislative norms or legislative organization that are dysfunctional from an aggregate 
welfare perspective. The canonical story has representatives in the United States Congress 
approve. each others' inefficient pork-barrel projects in quid-pro-quo logrolls (Barry R. 
Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, 1981). Alternatively, "high 
demanders" are said to self-select onto powerful Congressional committees that have 
jurisdiction over the pork-barrel projects their districts benefit from (Shepsle, 1978). 
The explanatory power of an approach that emphasizes the role of monetary 
contributions made by interest groups is quite limited; the same holds for an explanation 
that relies on specific features of the Congress. The phenomenon to be explained -- the 
policy bias toward special interests -- is observed across countries characterized by 
different political processes and institutions. Inefficient forms of public policy are common 
not only in the United States, but also in countries where monetary contributions to political 
candidates play an insignificant role, in some cases because campaigns are publicly 
financed. Similarly, pork-barrel politics are not only characteristic of the Congress, but also 
of legislatures controlled by strong political parties that enforce majoritarian party-line 
voting rather than universalistic logrolls or deference to stacked committees. It is not 
obvious whether or how the legislative failure argument would apply to the latter type of 
legislatures. 
3 Toward a Theory of the Policy Bias 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the link between informational asymmetries, 
the Olsonian free rider problem, and the policy bias toward special interests in a framework 
with rational, utility-maximizing agents. 
First, the theory is based on the assumption that agents are rational. This assumption 
allows voters to be ill-informed, but it restricts them to understand the nature of the game 
they are involved in: rational voters cannot be systematically fooled. Second, the theory 
demonstrates whether and how an office-motivated incumbent can achieve a net gain in 
political support if he biases policy toward a well-informed minority at the expense of an 
ill-informed majority, even if the losses imposed on the general public exceed the gains 
enjoyed by special interests. Third, the underlying informational asymmetry is derived 
endogeneously and linked explicitly to the free rider problem. Fourth, the theory is 
relatively simple and institution-free. It does not rely on specific features of political 
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processes and institutions that govern any one policy issue or country, except for the one 
feature that modem democracies have in common: regular free elections in which a majority 
of the electorate can vote the incumbent government out of office. According to the 
principle of Occam's Razor (entities should not be multiplied needlessly) a simple 
explanation is preferable to a more complex one that invokes idiosyncratic distortions. 
The central hypothesis is that special interests prevail because they are better able to 
monitor whether an incumbent policymaker is following their agenda. than are diffuse 
interests. For example, farm households are_ generally well-informed ·about legislation 
dealing with agricultural price supports and subsidies, and they can assess fairly accurately 
whether and how their political representatives contributed to the passage of an agricultural 
bill or to the size of price supports and subsidies the bill promises to deliver. In contrast, 
the huge majority of non-farm households is unlikely to know that an agricultural bill was 
passed at all; let alone are they aware of the details of the legislation. Members of the 
general public may well notice the decrease in their real disposable income generated by the 
increase in food prices and taxes, but they can assign political blame for the loss in their 
standards of living only very imprecisely. 
Because special interests are better able to monitor the quality of their political 
representation, an office-motivated policymaker has electoral incentives to bias policy to 
their advantage. By doing so, the incumbent can mimic an increase in quality vis-a-vis 
special interests at the expense of an apparent decrease in quality vis-a-vis the general 
public. Compared to the ill-informed majority, the well-informed minority places a higher 
weight on the possibility that the observed policy outcome is caused by the policymaker' s 
quality rather than other random factors. The reason is that the signal extraction problem 
solved by special interests is subject to less "noise" confounding their inferences. As a 
consequence, the incumbent gains more political support among members of the minority 
than he loses among members of the majority. 
The incumbent's opportunistic behavior creates competitive incentives for individuals 
to acquire better monitors of political performance. If the incentives to become informed are 
asymmetric, political outcomes will be biased in favor of well-informed individuals at the 
expense of their ill-informed counterparts. One source of asymmetry is the within-group 
free rider problem of costly information acquisition. Being smaller in number, special 
interests overcome this problem to a greater degree than does the general public. 
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On a more positive note, the voters' retrospective voting rule causes a welfare­
improving selection bias. Incumbents of above-average quality are more likely to survive 
voter scrutiny and remain in office. While elections create incentives for policymakers to 
follow suboptimal policies for re-election purposes, they also serve to get rid of low-quality 
political candidates. 
4 Policy and Selection Biases 
The model consists of N voters indexed h = 1, . . .  , N, where N � 3 and N is an odd 
number. The electorate can be decomposed into two homogeneous groups, a majority 
whose M individual members are indexed with the lower-case letter j, and a minority 
whose N-M individual members are indexed by i, where j = 1, . . . , M, i = M + 1, . . .  , N, 
and 
N + 1 
� M < N. These two groups will also be referred to as the general public and 
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the special interest. The members of each group are homogeneous; the parameters that are 
common to all members of the majority and minority are indexed with the capital letters J 
and I, respectively. 
Each voter h desires the incumbent policymaker to take a favorable action ah; the 
voter's utility decreases quadratically with the distance between the action aER taken by 
the policymaker and the voter's ideal point ah. The general public's preferences over the 
policymaker's action conflict with those of the special interest: al ":/:.a,. 
Political candidates differ in some positive-valued attribute, labelled candidate quality, 
that has the potential to improve the well-being of the electorate when they are in power. 1 
(An extension in which candidates differ in their policy positions, about which voters have 
conflicting preferences, will be discussed later on.) Formally, political candidates are 
characterized by a quality parameter q, which is randomly drawn from a normal distribution 
with zero mean and strictly positive but finite variance a/. Voter utility increases with the 
incumbent's quality.2 The majority and the minority thus have a common interest: to ensure 
that a policymaker of above-average quality sets policy. 
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In summary, voter h's utility level in each time period is given by 
1 ( " )2 (1) . uh = - 2 a - ah + q . 
Neither the general public nor the special interest can directly observe the action taken 
by the incumbent
.
policymaker; nor can they directly observe candidate qualit�. People can, 
however, form indirect and imperfect inferences about the incumbent's quality based on 
observed policy outcomes. Formally, I assume that each individual observes the degree to 
which she is favored by the outcome of the policy process, 
(2) 
1 ( " )2 ITh=- -a - ah + q+ph ' 2 
where ph is an individual-specific process shock, which is randomly drawn from a normal 
distribution with zero mean and strictly positive but finite variance a p.h 2• The individuals' 
process shocks are independently distributed. (An extension allowing for correlated shocks 
will be discussed later on.) In a simple way, the process shock captures the random nature 
of the interaction of multiple (unmodelled) actors and circumstances that affect the outcome 
of complex political and economic processes and thus impact on voter utility. 
In practice, special interests are better informed than is the general public: a,,/ > 
a ,,,12 • They are better able to disentangle whether observed policy outcomes are caused by 
the incumbent's action, his quality, or other random factors confounding their inferences. 
My analysis is, however, not predicated on the assumption that the minority group is better 
informed than is the majority group. Instead, I first derive the equilibrium without 
specifying which group (if any) enjoys an informational advantage: a,,,/ � a,,/. Later 
on, the informational asymmetry across groups is derived endogeneously by assuming that 
each individual h can pay a cost ch to lower the variance a ,,,h 2 of her observation TI,,. 
Political candidates care about aggregate welfare, or they derive utility from being in 
power. Their utility level in each time period is given by 
N 
(3) LUh + S , h=l 
where the first term stands for aggregate welfare; the index variable S takes on the value S 
if the political candidate is in power in the time period under consideration and the value 
8 
zero otherwise, S e [O, oo) . The parameter S captures the degree- to which political 
candidates are office-motivated: it is equal to zero if they are concerned only with aggregate 
welfare and goes to infinity as the (re-)election goal becomes dominant. 
The expression for aggregate welfare weighs the individual utilities equally. One 
distinguishing characteristic of special interests might be that they care more strongly about 
the policy issue under consideration than does the general public. This possibility is easily 
integrated into the model by having the policymaker weigh minority utility more heavily. 
The qualitative results of the analysis, which defines policy and selection'biases relative to 
the outcome that maximizes aggregate welfare, are not affected. 
Finally, I assume that candidates themselves are uncertain about their quality. 
[Supplemental Appendix I (available upon request) discusses an extension in which 
candidates are privately informed about their quality.] One plausible i?terpretation of 
candidate quality has both candidates and voters imperfectly informed about the fit between 
the candidates' known positions and the unknown characteristics of the political and 
economic environment. For example, candidates might differ in their ideology about the 
workings of the economy (John E. Roemer, 1994), in which case candidate quality would 
stand for the objective accuracy of their ideology. 
The assumption that candidates do not enjoy an informational advantage vis-a-vis 
voters simplifies the model but also serves an important analytical purpose. It allows me to 
isolate the policy and selection effects. that arise because of infof!Ilational asymmetries 
across voters and to avoid confounding effects arising from informational asymmetries 
between candidates and voters. I will demonstrate that the policy bias arises because of the 
strategic interaction between an incumbent and his voters and not between different types of 
incumbents. The bias is driven by the incumbent's desire to make voters believe that he is 
of above-average quality, independently of his actual quality, and not by the incumbent's 
desire to separate himself from other, lower-quality types, as might be suggested by the 
standard model of costly signaling (A. Michael Spence, 1973). 
The model has two time periods. [Supplemental Appendix II (available upon request) 
argues that the qualitative results -- the policy and selection biases as well as retrospective 
voting -- are robust in the presence of an infinite horizon.] Time superscripts are omitted 
whenever possible to avoid notational clutter. For simplicity, I assume that second-period 
utilities are not discounted. 
9 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 1 lists the time sequence of events. In the first period, the incumbent 
policymaker takes the action a1• Nature then draws the policymaker' s quality q and the 
individual-specific process shocks, pp . . . , PN· Each voter h subsequently observes the 
policy outcome IIh and chooses whether to vote for the incumbent ( vh = 1) or the 
challenger ( vh = 0). The incumbent remains in power if he receives a majority of the vote, 
that is, at least N + 1 votes. Otherwise he is replaced by a challenger. The election winner 
2 
then takes the action a2• If the challenger won, his quality q is a "fresh draw." Finally, the 
game ends, and the players' payoffs are realized. 
The equilibrium concept is a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Voters are 
restricted to use weakly undominated voting strategies. This refinement is invoked to 
eliminate implausible voting equilibria of the following kind. Suppose each voter believes 
that all other voters will vote for one candidate independently of their private information. 
Then this candidate will win the election for sure. As a consequence, each voter is 
indifferent between voting for or against this candidate, and she may thus choose to follow 
a pure strategy of voting for this candidate independently of her private information. Thus, 
one candidate may win the election even though it is common knowledge that a majority of 
voters expect to be better off if the other candidate won. 
Another complication arises in the voting setting analyzed here: the "swing voter's 
curse" (Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, forthcoming). Each voter has 
private information (the individual-specific realization of the policy outcome, IIh) about a 
common value that affects the utility levels of all voters (the incumbent's quality q). As a 
consequence, each individual has incentives to condition her vote on the information 
revealed by her vote being decisive for the election outcome. Her voting decision is based 
on her posterior expectation about the incumbent's quality, E(q I IIh,D), which is 
conditioned not only on her private information but also on the information implied by 
N-l N-1 
exactly other individuals voting for the incumbent and other individuals 2 2 
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voting for the challenger, where E is an expectations operator and D stands for the 
information implied by the voter casting the decisive vote. 
DEFINITION: A Bayesian Nash equilibrium, refined to rule out weakly dominated 
strategies, is given by the incumbent's first-period action a1 *; the individuals' voting rule 
vh * ( ITh ), and the election winner's second-period action a2 *. (The superscript * indexes 
equilibrium values.) The players' strategies are best responses. The voters use Bayes' rule 
to update their beliefs. 
PROPOSITION 1: The unique3 Bayesian Nash equilibrium, refined to rule out weakly 
dominated strategies, is given by the incumbent' s first-period action, which is subject to a 
policy bias, 
(4) 
the individuals' retrospective voting rule, 
(5) 
otherwise 
and the election winner's unbiased second-period action, 
(6) 
* A M A N-M a2 = a 1 - + a1 ---N N 
Where ¢1i = fh( O), fh is the probability distribution function of q+ p,,, and e = 
PROOF: 
The model is solved by backwards induction. In the second (and last) period of the 
game, there are no re-election incentives so that the incumbent's  action maximizes second­
period aggregate welfare. His first-order condition is given by 
1 1  
(7) 
His second-order condition has negative sign: 
(8) 
It follows that the equilibrium second-period action a2 * 1s given m equation (6) in 
Proposition 1. 
At the end of the first period, each individual must decide whether to vote for the 
incumbent or the challenger. Her vote cannot ex post change her first-period utility; it can 
only influence her second-period expected utility. Each individual votes for the incumbent 
if she expects to be better off if the incumbent remained in power, given her private 
information and the information implied by her vote being decisive. Since both the 
incumbent and the challenger take the same action in the second period, the only difference 
between the two candidates lies with their expected qualities. The individual has no 
information (other than her prior) about the challenger's quality so that the challenger's 
expected quality is zero. She cannot directly observe the incumbent' s quality; but at the time 
of the vote each individual observes the policy outcome. The individual can use her private 
information and her knowledge about the equilibrium to form an estimate of the 
incumbent's quality. Her inferences ·are confounded by the individual-specific process 
shock. 
In equilibrium, a1 = a1 * holds, implying that equation (2) is equivalent to 
(9) - TI 1 ( * A )2 q + Ph - h + - a1 - ah · 2 
Voter h cannot directly observe the individual components of the left hand side of equation 
(9), q and ph, but she knows that the sum q + ph is equal to the right hand side of this 
equation. She is privately informed about the value of the first term on the right hand side, 
nh; the value of the second term, �(al * - ah )2 ' is not directly observed but is known in 
2 
equilibrium. 
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Consider first the case in which voter h votes naively, that is, solely based on her 
private information without talcing into account the information implied by her casting the 
decisive vote. Her expectation of the incumbent' s quality solves the standard signal 
extraction problem (Morris H. DeGroot, 1970 p. 167). The value Ilh + _!.(a1 * - ah)2 can 2 
be thought of as a random sample from a normal distribution with unknown mean q and 
variance a q 2, where the prior distribution of the mean q is normal with mean zero. and 
variance a p./. Equation (9) thus implies that voter h's posterior expectation about the 
incumbent' s quality, E( q I Ilh), is a function of the observed policy outcome II11: 
(10) 
As I will argue later on, equation (10) contains the crucial intuition underlying the policy 
bias. The better informed is voter h, or the lower is the variance ap.h 2 of her process shock 
ph, the higher is the weight she places on the observation TI11, and the lower is the weight 
she places on her prior expectation of the incumbent's quality, zero. Moreover, the voter 
SU btracts - _!. ( a1 * - Qh )2 from the policy outcome Ilh, thereby rationally discounting the 2 
degree to which the policy outcome is favorable by the amount of the equilibrium policy 
bias. 
The voter supports the incumbent if her posterior expectation about the incumbent' s 
quality, E(q I TI1,), exceeds the chalienger's expected quality, zero. Equivalently, she votes 
for the incumbent if 
A naive voter thus follows the voting rule vh * given in equation (5) in Proposition 1 . 
I now examine whether a sophisticated voter, who takes into account the information 
implied by her casting the decisive vote, will also follow this rule. In equilibrium, the voter 
13 
takes as given that all other voters will do so. She knows that if her vote is pivotal it must 
N-1 be the case that equation ( 11) holds for -- voters other than herself and 
2 
(12) IT + _!_(a * - a )2 < 0 h 
2 .1 
h 
holds for the remaining N - l voters. Since there is no uncertainty about the policymaker' s 
2 . 
action a1 in equilibrium ( a1 = a1 *), equation (2) implies that equations (11) and (12) are 
equivalent to 
(13) q+ph2::0 
and 
(14) q +Ph < 0 , 
respectively. Given the symmetry of the underlying model, and noting that q + ph = 0 is a 
zero probability event, it follows that 
(15) E(q I D) = 0 . 
That is, the information implied by the individual casting the decisive vote per se does not 
shift her posterior away from her prior expectation about the incumbent' s quality. The 
voter's private information is critical in determining whether she believes the incumbent to 
be of above-average quality: 
Thus, the individual supports the incumbent if and only if equation (11) holds. It follows 
that a sophisticated voter employs the equilibrium voting rule v11 * given in equation (5) in 
Proposition 1. 
The coincidence of the sophisticated and naive voting rules depends crucially on the 
symmetry of the underlying model. In asymmetric settings, the naive voting strategy is not 
generally the best response for a sophisticated voter, who instead follows a retrospective 
voting rule with a different cutpoint. [Supplemental Appendix III (available upon request) 
demonstrates that the qualitative features of the equilibrium -- the policy and selection 
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biases as well as retrospective voting -- are robust with respect to the (a)symmetry of the 
model.] 
In the first period, the incumbent trades off the first-period welfare and second-period 
re-election consequences of his action lli. His first-order condition is given by 
(17) 
d [�u,'"' (a, )+ S + Et,u:·' + Pr(S =S I a, ) SJ _ 
d a1 
M( ,.. ) (N M)( ,.. ) dPr(S=S la1 ) S- O - a1 - aJ - - a1 - a1 + d = ' a1 
where Pr(S = S I a1 ) is the probability that the incumbent survives as a function of his 
action a1 , and 
(lS) dPr(S=S I a, ) = ±[aPr[S = S I Pr(vh = l)] aPr(vh = 11 a, )] = £ ±[aPr(v11 = 11 a, )] , 
d a1 h=I aPr(vh = 1) a a1 h=I a a1 
noting that a Pr [S =S I Pr(vh = l)] = £. The policymaker wms the election with any 
aPr(vh = 1) 
number of votes ranging from a simple majority to unanimity. Voter h is a member of some 
but not all possible supporting coalitions that form a majority. An increase in the probability 
that individual h votes for the incumbent leads to an £-increase in the probability that the 
incumbent remains in power,· where £.is the probability that the :voter is member of a 
supporting majority, averaged acros.s all possible majority coalitions. Supplemental 
Appendix IV (available upon request) proves that this probability is equal to 
N - . l h . h b f al' . f N -
l ( l)I ( )N-l 
( N; 1 } ( N; 1} 2 : t at 1s, t e num er o co 1tlons o -2- voters other than 
individual h supporting the incumbent and N -
1 
voters other than individual h opposing 2 
the incumbent, multiplied by the probability that each of these coalitions is formed. (Note 
that the unconditional probability that a given voter supports the incumbent is one half, as is 
the probability that this voter opposes the incumbent.) The formula for £ implies that £is 
strictly positive, decreases with N, and converges to zero as N goes to infinity. 
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The probability thatindividual h supports the incumbent's candidacy is a function of 
the action a1: 
(1 9) 
1 
1 A 2 1 A 2 ' - F. [-(a - a ) - -(a * - a ) ] h 2 I h, 2 I h ' 
where F,, is the cumulative distribution function of q +  ph. The incumbent's probability of 
survival thus varies with his action a1: 
(20) 
(21) 
dPr (S = S I a1) _ _ £ M ( n. _a )f [_!_(a _ a )1 _ _!_(a *_a )1 ] 
d -i J J 2 I J 2 I J a1 
- £ (N -M) (a - a ) F [..!.(a - a )2 - ..!.ca * - a )2 ] = I I JI 2 I I 2 I I 
The policymaker' s first-order condition ( 17) can then be rewritten as 
[ N - N 
] 
d ttUh1=1 (a,)+ S + EttUh1=2 + Pr (S =S I  a, ) S 
d a; 
-M(a, -a1) (1 + ¢1S £)-(N-M)(a, -a1)(1 + </>1S e) = o 
His second-order condition has negative sign: 
(22) 
d" [� Uh1=1 (a1) + S + E�Uh1=2 + Pr(S=S I a1) S] 
����������������� = (d ai)2 
- -
-M(l+</J1 Sc)-(N-M)(l+</J,St:)<O. 
It follows that the equilibrium first-period action, a,*, is given m equation (4) m 
Proposition 1 .  
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It remains to be shown that the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is unique. 
First, equations (21) and (22) imply that the incumbent's first-period action is the unique 
best response given the voters' retrospective decision rule. A mixed strategy is ruled out 
because the incumbent is never indifferent between taking one action or another. Second, I 
establish that the individuals' retrospective voting rule (5) is the unique best response 
independently, in effect, of the incumbent' s first-period strategy: in equilibrium each voter 
h fully discounts the effect of the incumbent' s action. on her utility so that her support for 
the incumbent depends only on the realization of the random variable q + ph [equations 
(1 1 )  and (1 3) are equivalent in equilibrium; the same holds for equations (12) and (1 4)]. 
Moreover, the voter's decision rule is independent of the election winner's second-period 
strategy, and trivially so, since the election winner's action does not depend on the election 
outcome. All voters necessarily follow the same retrospective decision rule. Once they have 
discounted the (differential) effects of the first-period action on their utilities, they have 
identical preferences for retaining an incumbent of above-average quality and identical 
equilibrium knowledge about other individuals' information sets conditional on their 
casting the decisive vote. The voters differ only with regard to their private information, 
which determines on which side of the voting cutpoint they end up, as specified in equation 
(5). The cutpoint of their retrospective voting rule is uniquely zero. Suppose instead that 
this cutpoint were nonzero. Then for some realizations of the observation I111 or, 
equivalently, of the random variable q + ph, individual h would be strictly better (worse) 
off voting for the challenger even though the voting rule in equation (5) requires her to vote 
for (against) the incumbent. The latter claim follows from the proof in Supplemental 
Appendix III (available upon request). Finally, mixed strategies of voting for one or the 
other candidate are ruled out, and abstentions are dominated. 4 For each possible realization 
of q + ph, the voter has a strict preference to vote for or .against the incumbent. The only 
exception is the probability zero event q + ph = 0, for which the voter is indifferent. 5 
Third, equations (7) and (8) imply that the election winner's second-period action is the 
unique best response independent of the other players' strategies. A mixed strategy is ruled 
out because the election winner is never indifferent between taking one action or another. 
PROPOSITION 2: The policy bias is zero if there is no conflict of interest or informational 
disparity between the majority and minority, or if the incumbent places zero weight on the 
re-election objective: 
17 
Otherwise policy is biased toward the well-informed group at the expense of the ill­
informed group: 
(24) I a1 * - a1 I> I a2 * - a1 I and I a1 * - a1 I< I�* - a1 I if aii./ > ap} 
I a1 * - a1 I< I a2 * - a1 I and I a1 * - a1 I> I a2 * - a1 I if ap,/ < ap,/ 
The size of the policy bias increases with the con.±1ict of interest and. the informational 
disparity between the two groups and with the weight the inc�mbent ·places on the re­
election objective: 
(25) sign 1 2 = sign 1 2 = sign 1 2 > 0 ·[d I a * - a *I ) ( d I a * - a *I ) (d I a * - a * I
J dla1-a11 dlap/-ap/1 ds 
· 
PROOF: 
The second-period action a2 * is a weighted average of the two groups' ideal points, 
with the weights reflecting the relative size of the two groups [see equation (6)]. Since the 
second-period action maximizes second-period aggregate welfare, it serves as a normative 
benchmark. A policy bias is obtained if the action taken by an office-motivated incumbent 
in the first period, a1 *, differs from this benchmark. The difference is given by 
(26) 
The conditions under which there is n6 policy bias, stated in equation (23) in Proposition 
2, follow straightforwardly from equation (26), noting that ¢1 = ¢1 is equivalent to 
a P} = a P} . These results demonstrate that the conflict of interest, a 1 =F-al' and the 
informational disparity between the majority and minority, a p.J 2 :f. a p,12, play a crucial role 
for the policy bias, a1 * :f. a2 *,as does the incumbent's re-election objective, S > 0. 
If none of the conditions in equation (23) is fulfilled, the incumbent systematically 
favors the group that is better able to monitor his performance. Equation (26) implies 
equation (24); that is, if ¢1 < ¢1 or, equivalently, ap,/ > ap/' then al >al implies 
al * < a2 * and a J < a I implies al * > a2 *; and vice versa. The direction of the policy bias 
depends only on the informational disparity between the two groups. 
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The size of the policy bias increases with the conflict of interest and the informational 
disparity between the two groups and with the weight the incumbent places on the re­
election objective. These comparative statics, stated in equation (25) in Proposition 2, also 
follow straightforwardly from equation (26), noting that 
a I</>� - </>i I 2 > O. a I <Jp,J - <lp,1 I 
PROPOSITION 3: The probability that the incumbent survives the election increases with 
. . 
his quality: 
(27) d Pr(S = S I q) O ------> . dq 
The resulting selection bias implies that the expectation of the incumbent's quality 
conditional on survival is strictly positive: 
(28) E(q IS = S) > 0 . 
The size of the selection bias increases with the degree to which each voter is informed: 
(29) d E(q IS= S) O ( 2) < 
. 
d (J p,h 
PROOF : 
Compared to an incumbent of low quality, a high quality type has better re-election 
chances because voters are more likely to experience favorable policy outcomes. Formally, 
equation (27) in Proposition 3 follows from 
(30) dPr(S=SI q) = f[C1Pr[S=SIPr(v,, =l)] aPr(vh =11 q)] = E ±[dPr(v,, =11 q)] == d q h=I d Pr(v,,==l) dq  h=I a q  ra rr 1 A 2 
J 
N Pr[ ,,?:.--(a1 *-a,,) ] N [ ] N [ ] N 
<I a
2 ==E'L, aPr(p,,?:.-q) =<L. d[l-Gh(-q)] =£2,[gh(-q)]>O 
"=' q ,,=, aq h=I aq h=I 
where G,, and gh are the cumulative and probability distribution functions of ph, 
respectively. 
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A political survivor -- a re-elected incumbent -- tends to be of above-average quality. 
Formally, equation (28) in Proposition 3 can be rewritten as 
(31) 
· ( N N+ l) E ql Lvh ;;:::; -- >0 , 
h=I 2 
which holds if 
(32) Pr{q > 0 I vh = 1) > Pr(q $ 0 I vh = 1) . 
Applying Bayes' Rule, the expressions on the left and right hand sides of equation (32) can 
be rewritten as 
(33) 
(34) 
P ( 0 I - l) _ Pr(vh = 11q>0) Pr(q > 0) r q > vh - - , Pr(vh = 11 q > 0) Pr(q > 0) + Pr(vh = 11q$0) Pr(q $ 0) 
Pr(q $ 0 1 vh = l) = Pr(vh = 11q$0) Pr(q $ 0) 
Pr(vh = 11q>0) Pr(q > 0) + Pr(vh = 11 q $ 0) Pr(q $ 0) 
Since q is symmetrically distributed around zero, and noting that q = 0 is a zero probability 
event, it holds that Pr(q > 0) = Pr(q $ 0). Equation (32) is thus equivalent to 
(35) Pr(vh = 11 q > 0) > Pr(vh = 11 q $ 0) . 
Equation (35) follows from equation (30), thereby establishing the validity of equation (28) 
in Proposition 3. 
A better infor:med voter can disentangle more effectively the effects of candidate 
quality and other random factors on observed policy outcomes. Voter information thus 
improves the selection bias. Formally, equation (29) in Proposition 3 holds because 
(36) 
a [Pr ( q > 0 I v h = 1) - Pr ( q :::; 0 I v h = 1)] 
( 2) <0' a CJ p.h 
or, equivalently [compare the derivation in equations (32)-(35)], 
(37) 
a [Pr ( v h = 1 I q > 0) - Pr ( v h = 1 I q $ 0)] 
a (CJP}) 
= 
a (Pr [Tih ;::: - _!_(a1 * - ah)2 I q > O] - Pr [Tih ;::: - _!_(a1 * - ah)2 I q $OJ) . 2 2 
�����������-,-�--,----���������--'-- = 
a (CJ p. / ) 
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d[Pr(ph ;?:- ql q>O)- Pr (ph ;?:- ql q�O)] = d[- Gh(- ql q>O)+Gh(-qlq�O)] <O, 
a (CJ p./) a (CJ p./) 
noting that CJ p,h 2 is the variance of the probability distribution function gh. 
PROPOSITION 4: The policy bias reduces first-period aggregate welfare: 
(38). 
The selection bias increases second-period expected aggregate welfare: 
(39) 
a( Efu,'"') 
h=I > 
O 
• 
d E( q IS= S) 
PROOF: 
(40) 
First-period welfare is given by 
iu t=I = - i.ca - a )2 M(N -M)[M(l + </J1SE)2 + (N -M)(l + </J1SE)2] ' h=I h 2 J I [M(l+</J1SE)+(N - M)(l+</J1SE)]2 
second-period expected welfare by 
(41 )  ELN u t=2 - 1 ( A A )2 M (N -M) 1 ( I s  -) -- a � a  +-E q =S N, h 2 J I 'N 2 ' h=I 
noting that the unconditional probability of survival, Pr (S = S), is equal to one half. 
In the first-period there is no potential for a selection bias, only for a policy bias. The 
. 1 ( A A 2 M (N - M) . . d express10n -- a 1 - a 1) , which reflects second-peno expected welfare 
2 N 
minus the expected gains from the selection bias, thus serves as a normative benchmark 
allowing us to assess the welfare costs of the first-period policy bias. The difference 
between this benchmark and first-period welfare is strictly positive, 
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implying that the policy bias is associated with a welfare loss. The favored group thus 
gains less than the disfavored group loses. 
In the second period, there is no potential for a policy bias, only for a selection.bias . 
. Equation (28) implies that the amount by which the selection bias increases second-period 
expected welfare, .!_ E(q IS= S) N, is strictly positive. 
2 
5 Group Size and Endogeneous Informationa Asymmetries 
The results presented so far are based on an exogeneously given informational 
disparity between the majority and minority. This section endogenizes the informational 
asymmetry py examining the incentives of the members of each group to become informed, 
or to acquire a lower-variance monitor of political performance, at a cost privately incurred 
by each individual. Each voter chooses how many resources to invest in gathering 
information. By becoming better informed, the individual can bias policy in her favor, or 
partly undo a policy bias favoring the opposing group; and she can improve the selection 
bias . 
The private cost of information gathering in conjunction with the collective 
implications of the policy and selection biases imply that the individuals' information 
gathering decisions are subject to a free rider problem. This problem is conceptually more 
complicated than the standard one . A within-group free rider problem is nested in a free 
rider problem shared by the entire electorate . With regard to the policy bias, each individual 
has goals in common with one group of individuals, whereas her goals conflict with those 
of the other group. A free rider problem arises because she would prefer other members of 
her group to bear the costs of information gathering. But in addition, she has competitive 
incentives to gather information in order to undo the effect of the informational investments 
made by the opposing group. With regard to the selection bias, both groups have a 
common goal: to gather information in order to increase the expected quality of the future 
incumbent. This collective enterprise is subject to a free rider problem common to all 
voters. 
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Given the importance of group size in standard analyses of the free rider problem, it 
is clearly of interest to examine the degree to which each group is able to overcome this 
problem as a function of its size. I analyze whether asymmetries in group size translate into 
an informational disparity that in tum causes a policy bias. From a welfare perspective, I 
examine whether information is under- or oversupplied in equilibi:ium. 
In a pre-stage to the game analyzed above, voter h decides whether to acquire costly 
information (see Figure 1). Her choice variable is the private cost of information gathering, 
ch, which enters her utility function additively. The aggregate costs of information 
acquisition affect the utility function of political candidates who care about aggregate 
welfare. However, the informational costs are sunk at the time of the first-period 
incumbent's and election winner's decisions so that their equilibrium strategies are not 
affected. 
I now tum to the specification of the information gathering technology. For an 
individual h who remains totally uninformed, the variance a p,h 2 of the process shock ph 
approximates infinity. As the voter gathers more information, the variance ap,h2 decreases, 
with decreasing marginal returns from information gathering, and goes to zero as the 
individual becomes fully informed. It is useful to specify the information gathering 
technology in terms of the parameter </>h = J,, (0) , which is inversely correlated with a p,h 2, 
ranging from one to zero as a p,h 2 varies from zero to infinity. For the sake of concreteness, 
I assume a specific functional form: 
where ch E [O, l]; the endpoints of the unit interval correspond to the cases where voter h 
remains uninformed and where she becomes perfectly informed, respectively. 
PROPOSITION 5: All individuals become partially informed, but each member of the 
minority invests more resources in information gathering than does each member of the 
majority: 
(44) O < c * < c * <1 . J I 
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PROOF: 
The formal analysis makes use of the individual indices j = 1, . . . , M and 
i = M + 1, . . .  , N, even though in equilibrium the members of each group invest identical 
resources in information gathering. The reason is that each individual takes as given the 
equilibrium amount of information purchased by all other individuals, including the 
members of her own group. 
Individual} chooses the cost cj that maximizes her two-period expeded utility 
(45) - cj + Ut1 (¢/cj )) + EUt2 (¢/cj )) = - cj 
_ .!.ca -a )2 . CN - M)2 o + <Pis e)2 2 J I [N+</JjSe+(M - l) </J;Se+(N - M) </J1Se]2 
_ .!..ca1 - a1 )2 CN - M)2 + .!..E(q 1 s = s) . 2 N2 2 
Her first-order condition is given by 
(46) 
_d�[-_c_j_+_u_j_1=_1 (_¢;_· <_cj_))_+_E_u_1_.1=_2 _(<P_j (_cl_.)_:.)] = - 1  + a ut1 _a <P_j + .!_ a E(q I s = S) _a <P_j = 
d c1 d </Jj d Cj 2 d </Jj d Cj 
- 1 + '
cal - a,)2 (N-M)2,(l + </J,Se)2 Se _1 _ + .!.. d E(q l S = S) _l _ · = o . [N + ¢1Se + (M-1) </J1Se + (N-M) </J1Se]3 2,JC; 2 d ¢1 2,JC; 
Substituting equation ( 43) into equation ( 46) , and noting that ¢1 = </J1 in equilibrium, 
equation (46) can be rewritten as 
(47) _ 1 + _1_ ca1 - a,)2 (N-M)2 o + ¢,Se)2 Se + -1- a E(q 1 s = S) ' ¢ · =t/l1 = 0 . 2</J1 [N + M</J1SE+ (N-M)¢1SE]3 4 </J1 "d ¢1 1 
The corresponding equilibrium first-order condition for an individual of type I is given by 
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(48) - 1+ -1- cal -a, )
2M2 (l+ </>1S e)2 S e + -l_ d E(q lS=
S ) l ¢· = ¢1 =0 . 2 ¢, [N + M <f>1S e + (N - M )</>1S e]3 4¢, a </>; ' 
Substituting equation (47) into equation (48) and simplifying, the following equation 
obtains: 
(49) 
According to equation (49), M > N -M implies </>1 < ¢, . Moreover, the assumption of 
diminishing marginal returns from costly information gathering eliminates comer solutions 
( </>1 = </>1 = 0 or </>1 = </>, = 1). It follows that 0 < c1 * < c, * < 1 .  All voters become partially 
informed, but a voter of type J invests less resources in information gathering than does a 
voter of type I, as stated in equation (44) in Proposition 5. (The latter result does not imply 
that the minority group as a whole gathers more information than does the majority group 
as a whole, nor is this possibility excluded.) The informational asymmetry a p,I 2 < a pJ 2 
thus arises endogeneously, implying that policy will be biased toward the special interest at 
the expense of the general public. 
The uniqueness-of-equilibrium result continues to hold when the equilibrium play 
characterized in Proposition 1 is preceded by an information gathering stage as specified 
above. The assumption of diminishing marginal returns from costly information acquisition 
is crucial for the uniqueness of the individuals' informational investments. 
PROPOSITION 6: The relative size of the informational investments made by the members 
of the majority and minority groups decreases with the relative size of the majority: 
(50) 
CJ * (M) C; * (M - 1 ) fi !': d N ___:__ _ < or J zxe . 
c 1  * (M) c1 * (M - 1 )  
The degree to which each individual becomes informed decreases with the number of 
voters, converging to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity: 
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(51) ch * (N) < cH * (N - 1) ; ch * -7 0 as N -7 oo • 
PROOF: 
Equation (50) in Proposition 6 is implied by equation (49), noting that <Ph = .J0, . The 
smaller is the spedal interest group, the less severe is its within-group free-!ider problem 
compared to the corresponding problem faced by the general public. 
Equation (52) follows straightforwardly from equations (47) and (48) ,  noting that 
s(N) < s(N - 1) and e -7 0 as N -7 oo , As . the number of voters increases, the 
individuals' incentives to contribute to policy and selection effects are increasingly muted 
because the probability that any one vote is decisive, e, goes to zero. In the limit, for 
infinite N, no individual becomes informed because no single vote affects · the electoral 
outcome. 
PROPOSITION 7 :  From an aggregate welfare perspective, information may be under- or 
oversupplied in equilibrium: 
(52) ch * <  c , 
where c is the welfare-maximizing value of ch .  
PROOF: 
Equation (38) implies that information gathering efforts driven by the policy bias lead 
to a social deadweight loss. From a welfare perspective, it is optimal for all individuals to 
be equally well�informed: the welfare-maximizing value of ch ,  c ,  is identical for all h .  
Thus, the deadweight cost of information gathering privately incurred b y  each individual 
must be traded off only against the collective gains generated by the resulting increase in the 
selection bias. The socially optimal c thus solves the first order condition 
(53) 
d [-c, + t U,'"1 (¢, (c, )) + t EV,'"' (<J>, (c, ))l 
= 
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0 ' 
where "(jj = -JC. A comparison of this first-order condition with the equilibrium first-order 
conditions (47) and (48) shows that informational investments driven by the 
counterproductive policy bias are oversupplied independent of their size. In contrast, 
information gathering efforts driven by the selection bias are undersupplied by a factor of 
N. This factor reflects the severity of the free rider problem shared by the entire el�ctorate. 
The net effect is ambiguous, as stated in equation (52) in Proposition 7.  The result that 
information may be oversupplied is interesting insofar as it contradicts the standard 
intuition according to which voluntary and costly contributions to a public good will be 
subdptimally low. 
6 Discussion 
This analysis develops a precise intuition explaining why an incumbent can achieve a 
net gain in political support when he biases policy toward a minority of voters at the 
expense of a majority, even if the losses incurred by the general public exceed the gains 
enjoyed by special interests. Each voter would like to re-elect an incumbent of above­
average quality, but she cannot fully disentangle the contribution of the incumbent' s quality 
and other forces driving the observed policy outcome. She may experience a favorable 
policy outcome because the incumbent is a high-quality candidate; because policy is biased 
in her favor; or because she is lucky. Based on the observed policy outcome, the voter 
forms an inference about the incumbent's quality. She does so by solving a signal 
extraction problem that assigns weights to various factors that influence the observed policy 
outcome, where the weight 'placed on any one factor decreases with the degree of 
uncertainty associated with the factor.. If the extent to which the observed outcome is 
favorable exceeds a critical threshold, she casts her vote for the incumbent; otherwise she 
votes for the challenger. The incumbent can mimic an increase in quality vis-a-vis special 
interests by biasing policy in their favor, at the expense of an apparent decrease in quality 
vis-a-vis the general public. Compared to the ill-informed majority, the well-informed 
minority places a higher weight on the possibility that the observed policy outcome is 
caused by the policymaker's quality. The reason is that the signal extraction problem solved 
by special interests is subject to less "noise" confounding their inferences. As a 
consequence, the incumbent gains more political support among members of the minority 
than he loses among members of the majority. By continuity, this argument holds even if 
the policy bias is associated with some inefficiency. 
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In equilibrium the incumbent' s attempt to fool the voters is futile. By 
opportunistically biasing policy toward special interests, the incumbent cannot 
systematically improve his re-election chances. This implication follows from the 
assumption that voters are rational: their signal extraction problem takes into account the 
effect of the incumbent's manipulations on observed policy outcomes. Nevertheless, the 
incumbent is trapped into producing a counterproductive policy bias because voters expect 
him to favor special interests. If he failed to satisfy their expectations, he would reduce his 
re-election chances to an unacceptable level. Thus, the voters' expectations are fulfilled in 
equilibrium. 
The voters' anticipation of policy and selection biases creates incentives to acquire 
better monitors of political performance. The private costs of information acquisition in 
conjunction with the collective consequences of policy and selection biases imply that the 
individuals' information gathering efforts are subject to a free rider problem. With regard to 
the policy bias, each individual would prefer other members of her group to bear the costs 
of information gathering, but she also has competitive incentives to gather information in 
order to offset the informational investments made by the opposing group. Asymmetries in 
group size translate into an informational disparity which in turn causes a counterproductive 
policy bias. From a welfare perspective, information is oversupplied in equilibrium to the 
extent that information gathering efforts are driven by the counterproductive policy bias. 
With regard to the selection bias, all voters have incentives to become better informed in 
order to improve the expected quality of the future incumbent. This collective enterprise is 
subject to the standard free rider problem. Information is undersupplied in equilibrium to 
the extent that information acquisition is driven by the selection bias. The net effect is 
ambiguous. 
The analysis suggests that small groups are favored because they are better able to 
overcome the free rider problem of becoming informed, compared to large groups. 
However, the model does not exclude the possibility of a policy bias toward large groups 
when they are relatively well-informed for reasons exogeneous to the model. For example, 
small business and senior citizens in the United States are generally well-informed about 
how their political representatives voted on small-business exemptions and social security. 
My informational hypothesis is consistent with the pervasiveness of regulatory exceptions 
for small business and with the "politically untouchable" quality of social security. 
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Of course, small business and senior citizens may be politically powerful for another 
reason: they are well-organized interests. The informational hypothesis developed here can 
be extended to shed light on the role of interest group organization. An important function 
of political lobbies is to collect information about the activities of political representatives in 
a centralized way and then disperse this information among their. members. The members 
of organized interest groups may also collect information in a decentralized way, in which 
case organization serves to pool their information. Either way, organized interests have 
access to better, or lower-cost, monitors of _political performance.6 The implied electoral 
threat pressures politicians to follow the lobbies� agenda. The literature has emphasized 
intra-group heterogeneity of interests as an important variable explaining whether a group 
of individuals will become politically organized and active (Russell Hardin, 1 982 ch. 5 ) .  
Future research might pay attention to the informational heterogeneity of a group, defined 
as the degree to which the political and economic shocks that undermine the political 
monitoring capability of group members are correlated. 
My analysis also extends the literature on rational retrospective voting. Voters are 
differentially well-informed, and these informational differences arise endogeneously. 
Policymakers strategically choose to bias policy, and inefficiently so, for electoral reasons . 
This result is consistent with standard political business cycle models (e.g. ,  William D. 
Nordhaus,  1 975), according to which pre-election policy manipulations impact negatively 
on aggregate economic variables. In addition, my analysis implies that the policy bias will 
take the form of negatively-valued pre-election distributional effects ,  while the selection 
bias will lead to positively-valued post-election aggregate effects. 
Lohmann (forthcoming) extends the analysis to more than one policy dimension, 
constructing an example with three voters and three dimensions. Each voter is a well­
informed special interest on one dimension, where she benefits from a policy bias in her 
favor. On the other two dimensions, the voter is part of the ill-informed general public at 
whose expense policy is biased. In a highly stylized way, this example captures a collective 
dilemma modem democracies appear to be trapped in . Inefficient government policies favor 
special interests at the expense of the general public. While special interests form a minority 
on any one policy dimension, just about every citizen is a member -- whether active or not -
- of at least one special interest group on some policy dimension. Each citizen prefers being 
favored by government policy even at the expense of inefficiencies imposed on the society 
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at large. But relative to the status quo involving ·inefficiencies on all policy dimensions, 
each citizen would be better off if government did not cater to special interests at all. Voters 
clamour for government to streamline and reduce the scope of its redistributive activities. 
But any serious attempt to implement the expressed wish of the general public requires 
cutting the pet programs of special interests, and any politician who would do so can count 
on being dead on arrival at the polls. 
The informational argument developed here explains why political -competition does 
not allow voters and their political representatives to break free of this multi-dimensional 
collective dilemma. At first glance, a political entrepreneur who stood for election offering 
to eliminate all the perks enjoyed by special interests would be elected by unanimous vote. 
But people cannot effectively monitor whether the candidate keeps his promise. Once 
elected, the office-motivated incumbent shares the incentives of his predecessors to cater to 
special interests. 
The policy bias could be reduced if well-informed interest groups or political 
candidates dispersed information to the general public. (To some degree this already 
happens when interest groups monitor legislators' voting records and publish interest 
group ratings, or when political challengers attack the legislative records of incumbents 
they seek to unseat.) However, political competition is unlikely to fully eliminate the 
informational disparity across groups: the interests of potential information providers do 
not coincide with those of the general public, and their efforts to educate the public are 
subject to a free rider problem, 
My analysis assumes that candidate quality is a "valence issue"; that is, candidates are 
linked with some condition that is valued positively or negatively by the entire electorate 
(Donald E. Stokes, 1 963) .  In contrast, "position issues" involve government actions over 
which voters have conflicting preferences. One possible extension would allow candidates 
to be purely policy-motivated and differ in their policy preferences. Suppose each voter is 
incompletely informed about the candidates' policy ideal points. She only observes the 
policy outcome. Based on this observation, each voter forms an estimate of the distance 
between the incumbent' s policy ideal point and her own. She compares this distance to the 
expected distance between the challenger's ideal point and her own and then votes for the 
candidate whose ideal point is expected to be closer. The incumbent thus faces a tradeoff. 
On the one hand, he can set policy so as to persuade the voters that his interests coincide 
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with theirs, thereby increasing his chances of survival. Being policy-motivated, the 
policymaker derives utility from being re-elected because he prefers himself to set policy 
rather than have policy be set by a candidate with different policy preferences. On the other 
hand, the more the incumbent accommodates any given voter, the larger is the distance 
between the policy and the incumbent' s ideal point, and the lower is the policymaker' s 
first-period utility. The incumbent trades off the second-period selection effects and the 
first-period policy effects on his utility level. This setting allows us to examine whether the 
policymaker accommodates well-informed voters to a greater extent than ill-informed 
voters . 
Next, the policymaker's task might consist of distributing a "pie" among the 
electorate. For example, the incumbent might face the task of allocating a given amount of 
tax revenue toward transfers, subsidies, and the like. The question is whether a 
redistributional bias emerges, favoring well-informed voters at the expense of their ill­
informed counterparts. Moreover, it would be of interest to examine whether and how the 
degree to which people become informed and thus contribute to a redistributional bias in 
their favor is influenced by the per capita stakes involved. 
The policymaker might also choose between policy instruments characterized by 
different degrees of opaqueness or imperfect control (R. Douglas Arnold, 1 99 1 ;  Stephen 
Coate and Stephen Morris, 1994; Alberto Alesina and Alex Cukierman, 1 990; Cukierman 
and Allan H. Meltzer, 1 986). For example, Arnold ( 199 1 )  argues that the degree to which 
political decisions are representative depends on the complexity of the causal chain that 
links policy instruments controlled by policymakers to policy effects experienced by their 
constituents. The more complex is this link, the greater is the degree to which incumbents 
can afford to follow policies that favor special interests at the expense of their constituents. 
Policymakers may deliberately use opaque policy instruments in order to prevent their 
constituents from becoming aware of the policy bias toward special interests. 
Finally, I would like to pay homage to the article that originally motivated this 
research program. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom ( 199 1 )  develop a principal-agent 
model in which the agent has multiple tasks with competing demands on the agent' s  time 
and attention. The principal can measure the agent' s  performance on some tasks more 
easily than on other tasks. If the principal provides a high-powered incentive scheme for 
activities that are more easily monitored, the agent will bias his efforts toward those . 
3 1  
activities. In this situation, the optimal incentive contract may involve a low-powered 
scheme such as paying the agent a fixed wage independent of measured performance. Since 
the principal deliberately foregoes monitoring the agent, this second-best solution is 
associated with some deadweight loss. 
In comparison, I develop a political principal-agent model with one agent (a 
policymaker) and multiple principals (voters) . Voters cannot write incentive contracts for 
the policymaker. Instead, they can vote him out of office if they are dissatisfied with his 
performance. The policymaker has only one task: he supplies a differentiated-benefits 
collective good. Voters differ in the degree to which they can monitor the incumbent' s 
performance. As a consequence, the policymaker has an incentive to bias policy in favor of 
voters who have better monitors of his performance. This bias in tum creates competitive 
incentives for voters to become informed. Their incentives are muted by the free rider 
problem associated with costly monitoring. In equilibrium, a policy bias arises if voters' 
incentives to become informed are asymmetric, for example, because their preferences or 
numbers are distributed asymmetrically. 
Arguably, term limits are the political equivalent of a low-powered incentive scheme. 
In my model, incumbents who are prevented from running for re-election do not have 
incentives to bias policy. (Clearly, this conclusion depends on the assumption that 
policymakers care about aggregate welfare. In practice, incumbents facing electoral 
termination might accommodate special interests who control their future career paths.) But 
the term limit solution is imperfect because it foregoes the selection gains generated by the 
voters' retrospective decision rule. 
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Endnotes 
* Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095. This 
research program is financially supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-
9308405. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Political Economy Conference at 
the University of California, Davis, in April 1994; the Conference on the Political Economy 
of Rent-Seeking and Conflict at the University of California, Irvine, in May 1994; the 
International Game Theory Conference at the State University of New York, Stony Brook-, 
in July 1994; the University of Southern Califoinia in October 1994; the 1994 Meetings of 
the American Political Science Association; the Conference on Analysis of Political 
Institutions at Northwestern University in July 1995; and the 1995 Meetings of the Public 
Choice Society and of the Midwestern Political Science Association. I am indebted to 
Andrew Dick, Avinash Dixit, David Epstein, Jack Hirshleifer, Kenneth Kollman, Nolan 
McCarty, Richard McKelvey, Roger Myerson, Klaus Nehring, Mancur Olson, Steven 
Postrel, Peter Rosendorff, Howard Rosenthal, and William Zame for insightful comments. 
1 Examples are leadership skills, competence in forging legislative coalitions, economic or 
foreign policy expertise, effectiveness in dealing with corruption or government waste, 
ability to create a political environment that is conducive to economic growth, and the like. 
2 For analytical simplicity, candidate quality enters the utility function additively. For some 
interpretations of candidate quality, the separability of the policymaker' s action and his 
quality might be considered 'implausible. An alternative specification would have the 
distance between the policymaker' s  action and the voters' ideal points depend on the 
unknown state of the world. High-quality candidates would have more accurate (lower­
variance) estimates of the state of the world than would low-quality candidates, with 
positive consequences for the voters ' (quadratic) utilities. The qualitative results of the 
analysis are robust with respect to this alternative specification. 
3 The equilibrium is unique up to events of probability zero (specifically, q + ph = 0 ) .  
4 In their analysis of the swing voter' s curse, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (forthcoming) 
come to the surprising conclusion that voters may abstain even when voting is costless. It 
is useful to examine why this abstention result does not obtain in my model. In Feddersen 
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and Pesendorfer' s model, voters prefer either the status quo or a policy alternative as a 
function of the unknown state of the world, which takes on one of two values. Some 
voters receive a partially informative signal about the state of the world, while others 
remain uninformed. Informed voters condition their vote on their private information. 
Uninformed voters may abstain to increase the impact of the votes cast by their informed 
counterparts, thereby increasing the likelihood of obtaining the "right" voting outcome. In 
my model, voters also have a common interest: after discounting the (differential) effects of 
the incumbent's first-period action on their utility, they share the desire to retain an 
incumbent of above-average quality .  But each voter is partially informed ahout the 
incumbent's quality, which is drawn from a continuum. Her private information determines 
on which side of the voting cutpoint she ends up. Except for events of probability zero, she 
has a strict preference to vote for or against the incumbent. 
5 For this reason, the equilibrium is unique only up to events of probability zero; see fn. 2.  
6 Formally, the decision to join an organized group at a private cost corresponds to the 
decision to acquire a better monitor of political performance at a cost. This decision is a 
binary one, amounting to a choice between a low or high level of information. In contrast, 
the informational investment analyzed in Section IV can take on any value on a continuum. 
The analysis would have to be modified accordingly. 
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FIGURE 1 .  TIME LINE 
Period 1 . . .  Period 2 . . .  
• • • • • • • • • 
Voter h invests ch in 
information gathering, 
h = l, . . .  , N . 
Nature draws incumbent' s 
quality q and individual­
specific process shocks 
PP . . .  ' PN · 
Voter h votes for 
incumbent, v h = 1,  
or for challenger, 
vh = 0. 
Election winner 
takes action a. 
Players' payoffs are realized. 
Incumbent talces action a. Voter h observes 
policy outcome nh , 
h = l, . . .  , N .  
Incumbent is re-elected 
"th N + l 
If challenger was elected, 
nature draws his quality q. w1 -- or more 
2 
votes; otherwise he is 
replaced by challenger. 
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